Property Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage: Florida\u27s Need for an Equitable Distribution Statute by Gentile, Melinda S.
Nova Law Review
Volume 8, Issue 1 1983 Article 4
Property Distribution Upon Dissolution of
Marriage: Florida’s Need for an Equitable
Distribution Statute
Melinda S. Gentile∗
∗
Copyright c©1983 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Property Distribution Upon Dissolution of
Marriage: Florida’s Need for an Equitable
Distribution Statute
Melinda S. Gentile
Abstract
Equitable distribution is a method of dividing marital property according
to the relative contributions of the partners upon dissolution of
the marriage.
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I. Introduction
Equitable distribution is a method of dividing marital property ac-
cording to the relative contributions of the partners upon dissolution of
the marriage. As the name of the doctrine implies, fairness and equity
in the division of property are the primary objectives. In 1980 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court handed down the landmark decision of Canakaris
1
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v. Canakaris1 which formally introduced the equitable distribution doc-
trine to Florida. However, for the last three years the district courts
have given such an array of interpretations to Canakaris that it would
be inaccurate to say that Florida has definitely adopted the doctrine of
equitable distribution as an independent vehicle for dividing marital
property. Moreover, the courts making equitable distributions are pro-
ducing such diverse results that the outcome of a dissolution proceeding
is practically impossible to predict.
The objective of this note is twofold. First, an analysis of the pre-
sent state of Florida law in the area of property distribution will be
made. The reasons underlying the current state of confusion will be
discussed by reviewing the most significant decisions in this area. Sec-
ond, a proposal for statutory clarification of equitable distribution will
be made. The type of statute, as well as the factors and guidelines that
must be included, will be proposed.
II. Historical Perspective: Development of Traditional
Vehicles for Property Distribution
Dissolution of marriage2 has become an all too frequent occur-
rence in American society. There were one million dissolutions last year
and more than one million are expected in the current year.3 One of the
most rapidly changing issues in the area of dissolution is property dis-
tribution. Currently the law on property distribution in Florida is in a
state of confusion. The confusion is attributable to Florida's uncertain
emergence from a common-law title state to an equitable distribution
state.
In order to understand the development of equitable distribution in
Florida, it is necessary to consider the evolution of the traditional vehi-
cles used by the courts to distribute property and fashion dissolution
decrees. The traditional vehicles are exclusive possession of property,
special equities and alimony.4 Far more than any other reason, the in-
consistent use of these vehicles is causing confusion in the Florida
1. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
2. In 1971 the Florida legislature changed the title of the divorce statute to "Dis-
solution of Marriage." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61 (West Supp. 1983). Thus, in this note the
term dissolution will be used instead of divorce in post-1971 references.
3. Divorce American Style, NEWSWEEK, January 10, 1983, at 42.
4. Child support is another vehicle the courts utilize to fashion divorce decrees,
but consideration of it is beyond the scope of this article. Child support has the most
indirect influence on the property distribution area.
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courts.
A. Alimony
At common law, the English eccelesiastical courts did not readily
authorize severance of the marital bond.5 Rather, the courts authorized
a type of separation by allowing the husband and wife to live apart,
while remaining legally married.6 Despite the judicially recognized sep-
aration, the husband was not released from his duty to support the
wife. Thus, as a concomitant grant of the separation, the courts
awarded alimony to the wife.7
American law incorporated the practice of granting alimony as an
incident to dissolution. Traditionally alimony was an award for support
and maintenance, 8 which the wife received with such unquestioned con-
sistency that it practically arose to the level of an undeniable right.9
The criteria for an award of alimony were the wife's need and the hus-
band's ability to pay.10
Permanent alimony is the traditional vehicle of awarding support
to the wife. Unlike temporary alimony which is, "an allowance made"
to a spouse "for maintenance during the pendency" of the dissolution
proceeding,"1 permanent alimony is awarded by the final decree of dis-
solution. The word permanent is used in contradistinction of the word
temporary to designate the character of the alimony.'2 The word per-
manent does not indicate "the amount to be paid or time during which
the payment should continue.' 3
Not only was permanent alimony the traditional type of alimony
awarded, it was traditionally made in periodic payments. The Florida
Supreme Court has stated that permanent periodic alimony is "not a
5. FLORIDA DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE 187 (The Florida Bar Continuing Legal
Education 1976).
6. Id. at 190.
7. H. CLARK JR., DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND PROBLEMS 446 (1980).
8. Bredin v. Bredin, 89 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1956); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d 169,
173 (Fla. 1951) (alimony signifies nourishment or sustenance).
9. Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
10. Id. at 722.
11. Floyd v. Floyd, 91 Fla. 910, 915, 108 So. 896, 898 (1926); See also Duss v.
Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 1087, 111 So. 382, 383 (1926) (temporary alimony is merely an
interim allowance given until final decree).
12. Soule v. Soule, 4 Cal. App. 97, 105, 87 P. 205, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906).
13. Id. at 105, 87 P. at 208.
1983]
3
Gentile: Property Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage: Florida's Nee
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Nova Law Journal
sum of money or a specific proportion of the husband's estate given
absolutely to the wife . . . [but] a continuous allotment of sums paya-
ble at regular periods for her support from year to year." 14 These peri-
odic payments may be modified according to a significant change in
circumstances 15 and generally terminate upon the death of either
spouse or remarriage of the receiving spouse."'
In 1947 the use of lump sum payments of permanent alimony was
statutorily authorized." Lump sum payments can be in cash or prop-
erty of a determined sum, on a single or multiple payment basis., This
method of payment, as distinguished from periodic payments, is final
and non-modifiable.19 According to the 1947 statute the court could not
order both periodic and lump sum payments. A choice between the
payment methods was required. This continued until 1963 when the
statute was amended to allow the court to award permanent alimony in
"periodic payments or payment in lump sum, or both, in its
discretion. 2 o
The Florida alimony statute remained relatively unchanged from
1963 to 1971. Then, in 1971, the Florida legislature significantly
changed its divorce statute as a whole.21 The new statute is titled "Dis-
solution of Marriage," instead of "Divorce." The prior grounds for di-
vorce required a showing of fault, such as adultery, cruelty, impotency,
or desertion.22 The new statute abolishes these requirements and only
requires the parties to declare that the marriage is irretrievably bro-
ken.23 The no-fault concept is a recognition of the need to "preserve the
14. Phelan v. Phelan, 12 Fla. 449, 456 (1868).
15. See, e.g., Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 65 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
16. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla. 1980).
17. Act of June 3, 1947, ch. 23894, 1947 Fla. Laws 539 (amended 1963).
18. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
19. See, e.g., Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1949).
20. Act of Sept. 1, 1963, ch. 63-145, 1963 Fla. Laws 306, amended by Act of
June 27, 1967, ch. 67-254, § 16, 1967 Fla. Laws 560, 606-613, to delete the phrase "in
its discretion." Also, the 1967 act renumbered the alimony statute from § 65.08 to §
61.08.
21. 1971 Fla. Laws 1319, ch. 71-241.
22. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.041 (West 1969).
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West Supp. 1983). Even though fault was re-
moved from the statute as a ground for dissolution, fault remains a consideration in
other aspects of the dissolution proceeding. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying
text.
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integrity of the marriage" 24 while "promoting the amicable settlement
of disputes that have arisen between the parties to a marriage .... ,,26
To be consistent with Florida's emergence as a no-fault state, the
Florida legislature significantly changed its alimony statute. As
changed, the statute specifically states that the court may grant ali-
mony of a type that is either "rehabilitative or permanent in nature. "26
Further, the statute states that with either award of alimony, the court
may order "periodic payments or payments in lump sum or both."127 As
evidenced by the language of this statute, the legislature recognized
permanent and rehabilitative as two distinct types of alimony.28 In ad-
dition the legislature specifically designated two methods of payment.
Periodic and lump sum are not referred to as types or distinct catego-
ries of alimony in the statute, but rather as methods of making pay-
ments of the previously designated types of alimony, permanent or re-
habilitative. However, Florida courts have not interpreted the statute
precisely in this manner. In addition to designating lump sum as a pay-
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.001(2)(a) (West Supp. 1983).
25. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.001(2)(b) (West Supp. 1983).
26. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(1) (West Supp. 1983) reads:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may grant
alimony to either party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent
in nature. In any award of alimony, the court may order periodic payments
or payments in lump sum or both. The court may consider the adultery of
a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony
shall be awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be
awarded.
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(1) (West Supp. 1983).
28. Kahn v. Kahn, 78 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1955), has been credited with the intro-
duction, in this state, of the concept of rehabilitative alimony. Brown v. Brown, 300 So.
2d 719, 723-24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974). The following statement by the Kahn
court illustrates the belief that women no longer are dependent upon men for support:
Times have now changed. The broad, practically unlimited opportunities
for women in the business world of today are a matter of common knowl-
edge. Thus in an era where the opportunities for self-support by the wife
are so abundant, the fact that the marriage has been brought to an end
because of the fault of the husband does not necessarily entitle the wife to
be forever supported by a former husband who has little, if any, more eco-
nomic advantages than she has. We do not construe the marriage status,
once achieved, as conferring on the former wife of a ship-wrecked mar-
riage the right to live a life of veritable ease with no effort and little incen-
tive on her part to apply such talent as she may possess to making her own
way.
Kahn, 78 So. 2d at 368.
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ment method, the courts are characterizing it as a distinct type of
alimony.
Although the concept of rehabilitative. alimony was not new to the
courts, it was not statutorily authorized until the 1971 amendment of
the alimony statute. The theory underlying rehabilitative alimony is
that if a means of extrinsic support is provided for a defined period of
time, the receiving spouse, within that period, will develop skills which
will provide the capacity for self-support." The use of rehabilitative
alimony "assumes necessarily either a previous potential or actual ca-
pacity for self-support" that has been dormant or lost during the mar-
riage, "and should be limited in amount and duration to what is neces-
sary to maintain that person through his training or education, or until
he or she obtains employment or otherwise becomes self-supporting."30
Whether the type of alimony is permanent or rehabilitative and
whether the method of payment is periodic or lump sum, the factors to
be considered by the court for making a proper award are set out in the
alimony statute.31 These factors assist the court in determining whether
the requisite need by the receiving spouse and concomitant ability by
the paying spouse exist for an award of alimony.
B. Special Equities Doctrine
The introduction of the doctrine of special equity significantly
29. See, e.g., Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
30. Id. at 543.
31. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1983) reads:
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the
court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited
to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage..
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties.
(d) The financial resources of each party.
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not
limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and ca-
reer building of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
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changed the law affecting property distribution. Originally the Florida
Supreme Court used the idea of special equities in order to avoid the
statutory rule that an adulterous wife could not be awarded alimony.32
As such the use of the doctrine was "to describe a vested interest in
property brought into the marriage or acquired during the marriage
because of a contribution of services or funds over and above the nor-
mal marital duties."33 As a vested interest, a special equity was entirely
separate from alimony. 34
However, the courts have misapplied the doctrine of special equity
to justify an award of alimony, usually in lump sum. 5 Generally the
doctrine is used incorrectly when the courts are confronted with a case
in which the marital property is titled in one party's name, yet the
other spouse has made significant contributions to accumulating the
property. The courts recognize that the parties deserve a fair distribu-
tion of the assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus, an award of
property in the form of lump sum alimony is made to the non-titled
spouse, based on a finding of a "special equity." When the courts refer
to this type of "special equity" a vested interest is not involved. Rather
reference is being made to the general equities of the situation that
justify an award of the property to the non-titled spouse. This inconsis-
tent use of the term special equity has led to confusion among the
courts. Even though the Florida Supreme Court has unequivocally
stated that, "[t]he term 'special equity' should not be used when con-
sidering lump sum alimony; rather, it should be used only when analyz-
ing a vested property interest of a spouse," 36 the confusion persists.
32. See Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932) (award of alimony
made to adulterous wife):
The provisions of section 4987, Comp. Gen. Laws, section 3195, Rev. Gen.
St., to the effect that no alimony shall be granted to an adulterous wife, do
not preclude the ascertainment and allowance by the court of an amount
to the wife for her special equity in property and business of the husband
toward which she is shown to have contributed materially in funds and
industry through a period of years while the marriage remained
undissolved.
Id. at 1075, 138 So. at 797.
33. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1980) (emphasis
added).
34. Id. at 1200.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1201.
1983]
7
Gentile: Property Distribution Upon Dissolution of Marriage: Florida's Nee
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Nova Law Journal
C. Exclusive Possession of Property
Another vehicle used by the courts in property distribution and
fashioning dissolution decrees is an award of exclusive possession of
property. Prior to the decision of Duncan v. Duncan,8 7 the Florida Su-
preme Court held that an award of exclusive possession of the marital
home must be for the benefit of the spouse with children and must
terminate when those children reach the age of majority.8 In Duncan
the Florida Supreme Court expressly rejected this assertion because it
is too inflexible. Duncan holds any exclusive possession award should be
either directly connected to the obligation to pay support, or necessary
to avoid a reduction in the property's value. An award of exclusive pos-
session should be for a specified period of time and must serve a special
purpose.89 It is subject to modification upon a change in circum-
stances.40 "The critical question is whether the award is equitable and
just given the nature of the case." 41
III. Emergence of the Equitable Distribution Doctrine in
Florida
Historically a common-law property state,42 Florida courts ex-
amined record title to determine who should be awarded the marital
property upon divorce. 8 If there were no record title, the courts traced
the acquisition of the property. Since the husband usually worked and
acquired his personal estate, while the wife worked inside the home,"
37. 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980).
38. See McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1979).
39. Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952. See also Richardson v. Richardson, 315 So. 2d
513 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (husband with custody of minor children awarded
exclusive possession over wife's petition to partition); Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (wife's award of exclusive possession justified by her
mental problems); George v. George, 360 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(wife with custody of a child, not a minor, awarded exclusive possession because as a
result of the child's handicap he would remain dependent on wife).
40. Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952.
41. Id.
42. FLORIDA DIssoLUTION OF MARRIAGE, supra note 5, at 441.
43. Id.
44. If examined from a historical perspective, women have been at a great disad-
vantage relative to property distribution. At common law the husband was regarded as
the guardian of his wife. The husband acquired seisen in any estate in which the wife
was seised by his right of marriage, jure uxoris. Upon the birth of a live child, the
[Vol. 8
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this method of analysis traditionally resulted in an award of the prop-
erty to the husband. The wife was typically left with an award of
alimony.
Slowly, Florida courts have acknowledged the inequities of this sit-
uation. There has been a progression from the common-law view that
the husband is the sole contributor to the accumulation of the marital
assets, to the more contemporary view that the marriage relationship is
a partnership. 5 As a partnership, marriage is a voluntary contract "for
the mutual participation in the profits which may accrue from the
property, credit, skill or industry, furnished in determined proportions
by the parties.' '46 The view of marriage as a partnership has gained
momentum since the new alimony statute was passed in 1971. The
emergence of equitable distribution in Florida is a logical extension of
this partnership view.
A. Brown v. Brown: The Partnership Concept
The foundation for equitable distribution in Florida was laid by
the First District Court of Appeal in the 1974 case of Brown v.
Brown,47 where property accumulated during a 21-year marriage was
at issue. In this marriage, one partner contributed time to the home
and children, while the other pursued the accumulation of material
wealth. The parties entered the marital venture with no estate of mate-
rial value. Shortly thereafter, the wife exchanged her career as a regis-
tered nurse for the role of housewife and mother, while the husband
successfully pursued a career as an accountant. The husband accumu-
lated the material wealth in his name.
Had the Brown court analyzed this marriage from the common-
husband could use, occupy and even sell the land, free from any claim of the wife. See
generally C.J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1962).
The Married Women's Property Act finally created equality between spouses when
property was held by the entireties. King v. Green, 30 N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49 (1959).
However, the concept of record title still remains. The inequities are apparent.
45. In Thigpen v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973) the
court stated, "[t]he new concept of the marriage relation implicit in the. . .. 'no fault'
divorce law ... places both parties to the marriage on a basis of complete equality as
partners sharing equal rights and obligations in the marriage relationship and sharing
equal burdens in event of dissolution . . . ." Id. at 585.
46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2801 (West 1952) (current version at LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 2801) (West Supp. 1983).
47. 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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law perspective, the wife would have surely been given a blind award of
alimony, while the husband would have been given a blind award of all
property titled in his name. However, recognizing that marriage is a
partnership, the Brown court declared that "a new day has been cre-
ated. .... 1"48 The court stated that periodic alimony should no longer
be awarded in an automatic fashion, "in the nature of an obligation to
a stranger. ' 49 Rather, it should be awarded only upon a showing of
need and ability to pay. In addition, Brown emphasized that special
attention should be given to the advisibility of an award of rehabilita-
tive alimony, where, as here, the wife has the capacity for self-support.
Most significantly, the Brown court approved the use of lump sum
alimony as a means of adjusting the material wealth of the parties at
the time of dissolution of the marriage.50 The court said, the salient
factual concern is not the name in whom title is recorded, but "each
spouse's contribution to the marital partnership."51 Despite the fact
that the property was titled in the husband's name, the court of appeal
instructed the trial court to enter an award of lump sum alimony suffi-
cient to compensate the wife for her contributions to the marriage.
Brown v. Brown represents a critical step toward recognizing the
marriage partnership theory as-it relates to distributing the material
wealth of the parties in accord with equitable principles. However, by
using lump sum alimony as the vehicle for distributing property, Brown
significantly contributed to nearly a decade of confusion in the courts.
The court used lump sum alimony, which had been a technical and
traditional method of making alimony payments, and made it an inde-
pendent vehicle for distributing property.
After Brown, Florida courts became more willing to take special
recognition of the contributions of both parties to the marriage. The
courts sometimes made awards of the marital property according to
48. Id. at 725.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 726. Contra the dissenting opinion of Judge Boyer in Brown. He
stated:
Alimony came about during the era that women ...were placed on a
pedestal by male chauvinists. Women apparently found being worshiped
on a pedestal to be distasteful and commenced a virtual worldwide drive to
be removed from their place of superiority to a. . .lower postion of equal-
ity . . . "Success" has been marked by loss of many heretofore existing
superior rights, among them being dower and alimony as a matter of right.
Brown, 300 So. 2d at 727.
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these contributions, yet no vehicle was consistently employed to effectu-
ate these distributions. Some courts used the lump sum alimony vehi-
cle. 2 Some courts used the special equity doctrine. 3 Other courts used
a combination of lump sum alimony and special equity;54 while still
others declined to use any or all of these for the purpose of property
distribution. 55
B. The Trilogy of Landmark Decisions: Introduction of Equi-
table Distribution
In 1980 the Florida Supreme Court handed down the landmark
opinions of Canakaris, Duncan, and Ingram.56 Examining this trilogy
of cases, all of which concern the property distribution issue, the su-
preme court acknowledged the current state of confusion. The supreme
court stated, "[t]he decisions in this subject area, both of this Court
and of the district courts of appeal, are not reconcilable. It is our in-
tent, . . . to the extent possible, [to] bring some stability to this area of
the law.' ' 57 The Florida Supreme Court perceptively attributed the con-
fusion to the inconsistent uses of lump sum alimony, permanent peri-
odic alimony, rehabilitative alimony, special equity and exclusive pos-
session of property. In an effort to bring some stability to the area of
52. See Harrison v. Harrison, 314 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 334 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1976) (award of $100,000 lump sum alimony); Linares v.
Linares, 292 So. 2d 63 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (award of marital home as lump
sum even though no special equities were shown); Goldman v. Goldman, 333 So. 2d
120 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (case remanded for award of lump sum because wife
shortchanged).
53. See Hendricks v. Hendricks, 312 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(special equity in home due to contribution of funds by wife); Olson v. Olson, 321 So.
2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (wife awarded home due to special equity based
on loan made by wife to husband for pilot training, reversed and found to be within
realm of ordinary duties).
54. See In re Marriage of Arnold, 335 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(award of home as lump sum reversed because no special equity shown); Cann v. Cann,
334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (lump sum alimony should not be
awarded unless there is a finding of special equity).
55. Niemann v. Niemann, 294 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 312 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1975) (holding courts are not allowed to simply divide
assets equitably).
56. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (the most noteworthy
and frequently cited of the three cases); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla.
1980); Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1980).
57. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1200.
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property distribution, it set forth definitions and proper uses of each
vehicle.
In Canakaris, the trial court had awarded the wife the husband's
one-half interest in the marital home using the vehicle of lump sum
alimony by finding she had a special equity due to her marital contri-
butions. The court of appeal reversed, holding the lump sum award
improper because the record revealed no special equity of the wife in
the marital home. The supreme court upheld the award of lump sum
alimony, but stated that the application of the special equity doctrine
was improper. Therefore, Canakaris holds the use of lump sum ali-
mony is not limited to "instances of support or vested property
interests." 58
Referring to Florida's alimony statute, the supreme court stated
that in granting lump sum alimony, the trial court should be guided by
all relevant circumstances to ensure equity and justice between the par-
ties.59 The court established new criteria for granting lump sum ali-
mony. "A judge may award lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable
distribution of property acquired during the marriage, provided the evi-
dence reflects (1) a justification for such lump sum payment and (2)
financial ability of the other spouse to make such payment without sub-
stantially endangering his or her economic status."60 Prior to this deci-
sion, need was the element required for lump sum alimony. Now, when
using lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution, only justi-
fication is required.'
This statement by the Florida Supreme Court led the majority of
courts to believe that the proper vehicle for making an equitable distri-
bution was lump sum alimony.' The Canakaris court did not indicate,
however, that the use of lump sum as a method of making permanent
alimony payments should be terminated. To the contrary, the use of
lump sum payments for spousal support was upheld. The Canakaris
court stated, "[i]n our opinion, the award of the marital home as lump
sum alimony may be coupled with other lump sum alimony or perma-
nent periodic alimony awards if justified by the evidence." 3 In essence,
the court established two distinct criteria for the award of lump sum
58. Id. at 1201.
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West Supp. 1983).
60. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201 (emphasis added).
61. Frumkes, Florida's Flight to Fairness (pt. 1), 56 FLA. B.J. 351 (1982).
62. Id. at 351.
63. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201.
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alimony. One criterion permits an award of lump sum alimony on the
basis of need plus ability to pay. Additionally, in the interests of equita-
ble distribution, a further lump sum award might be made based on the
criterion of justification plus ability to pay.
The newly endorsed use of lump sum alimony was to make an
equitable distribution. However, permitting ability to pay to remain a
criterion for making this type of lump sum award is contrary to the
basic theories of the equitable distribution doctrine. The first criterion,
justification, allows the court to make property distribution as justified
by the relative contribution of the marital partners. In fact, justification
provides for the use of guidelines to systematically determine what is
equitable. On the other hand, the second criterion, ability to pay, indi-
cates that the marital property actually belongs to one spouse who is
required to give this property to the other spouse to discharge a duty of
support. In the legal sense, payment is the performance of a duty or
obligation by the delivery of money or other value by a debtor to a
creditor.64 By including the payment element the Canakaris court has
interwoven the alimony theory into the equitable distribution doctrine.
By implication, one spouse is still making a payment to the other. Ar-
guably, this can only impede the proper use of the doctrine. Equitable
distribution should be used to promote the partnership concept of mar-
riage where property is acquired by the combined efforts of both par-
ties and divided accordingly upon dissolution."5
C. Canakaris: Confusion in the District Courts of Appeal
When Canakaris was first published, it was pronounced that equi-
table distribution had been adopted in Florida.66 However, within a
year, the district courts of appeal had given such an array of interpre-
tations to Canakaris that there remained as much, if not more, confu-
sion than in the pre-Canakaris days. In most cases, regardless of the
district, it is difficult to determine whether an award of lump sum was
used as alimony or in an equitable distribution of property. Also, it is
difficult to determine how the courts have applied the special equities
doctrine.
The First District Court of Appeal seemingly approved the doc-
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1016 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
65. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974).
66. Frumkes, supra note 61, at 351.
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trine of equitable distribution in Conner v. Conner.67 The court stated,
"[a]fter Canakaris, trial courts now have the discretion to use lump
sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution of property acquired
during the marriage." 68 Similarly, the Third District Court of Appeal
approved the doctrine in Roffe v. Roffe69 asserting "the trial court's
power to fashion . . . an equitable distribution of the parties' property
. . . which we think has been granted by Canakaris ... .
Initially the Second District Court of Appeal gave approval to the
use of the equitable distribution doctrine. In Neff v. Neffl1 the court
stated, "Canakaris confirms the fact that marriage may indeed be a
partnership. . . . If, as often happens, the harvest resulting from mu-
tual efforts winds up in the hands of one partner, the equitable share of
the other can be allocated by a award of lump sum alimony."72 How-
ever, this district ultimately announced that the equitable distribution
doctrine does not constitute "an independent vehicle for an award of
property in a dissolution of marriage proceedings. '73 Similarly, the
Fifth District Court of Appeal has given both approval74 and disap-
67. 411 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
68. Id. at 901. See also Jacobs v. Jacobs, 400 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (award of lump sum may be made to ensure equitable distribution if requested).
But cf. Drozak v. Drozak, 424 So. 2d 120 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (where the
circuit court denied the wife's petition for either periodic or lump sum alimony. The
district court reversed and remanded because "the requisite factors of the need for and
ability to pay permanent alimony, either periodic or lump sum" were not respected. Id.
at 121. The district court made no notice of the court's ability to use lump sum ali-
mony to ensure an equitable distribution.).
69. 404 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (however, this court may have
furthered confusion relative to the proper vehicle for making an equitable distribution
by referring to the use of reciprocal lump sum awards).
70. Id. at 1096. See also Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (holding court can divide assets fairly between partners using alimony); Cuevas
v. Cuevas, 381 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding court can use lump
sum alimony to ensure equitable distribution).
71. 386 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
72. Id. at 319.
73. Powers v. Powers, 409 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (distri-
bution should have been made by resort to alimony or special equities); Sec also Hu v.
Hu, 432 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
74. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (award of $200,000 lump sum awarded as an equitable distribution); Thompson
v. Thompson, 402 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (award of lump sum
upheld as valid equitable distribution of marital property). These cases are reported as
being illustrative of the cases in this district.
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proval to the doctrine. 5
The Fourth District Court of Appeal approved the use of equitable
distribution 76 but later rejected its use in Sangas v. Sangas.77 In San-
gas the court announced that the circuit court had erred in disposing of
and transforming the marital property "by use of the theory of equita-
ble distribution as an independent vehicle for an award. 17 8 To deter-
mine the final judgment the trial court had used the vehicles of child
custody, child support, alimony, and equitable distribution. The district
court of appeal pronounced that property should only be disposed of by
resort to the vehicles of alimony and special equities, equitable distribu-
tion being an "end or purpose rather than a vehicle or remedy. '7 9
Thus, Sangas defined the equitable distribution doctrine as the out-
come to be achieved by the use ot the established vehicles of lump sum
alimony, permanent periodic alimony, rehabilitative alimony, child sup-
port, a vested special equity in property and an award of exclusive pos-
session of property. However, Sangas did not clarify whether alimony,
when used as a vehicle to dispose of marital property, employed the
traditional use of alimony based on need and ability or the more con-
temporary use based on justification and ability.
The Fourth District, after approing the doctrine and then disap-
proving it, has now re-adopted the doctrine, in Tronconi v. Tronconi.80
The Tronconi court stated:
[I]n Sangas we opined that Canakaris did not create a totally new
vehicle for the division of property; however, we now think . . .
that although the Supreme Court [sic] continues to quote tradi-
tional concepts in the vernacular of lump sum, periodic and reha-
bilitative alimony, we believe it has adopted the doctrine of equita-
75. See, e.g., Gorman v. Gorman, 400 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(where home is only substantial asset, and there is no finding of need or special equity,
property law concepts should be used for distribution rather than equitable distribution
doctrine).
76. See, e.g, Bird v. Bird, 385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (lump
sum alimony award upheld as equitable distribution); Hurtado v. Hurtado, 407 So. 2d
627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (when considered together, award of lump sum
alimony, permanent alimony and child support upheld as equitable distribution).
77. 407 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
78. Id. at 633.
79. Id.
80. 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (en banc). This case is now
pending before the Florida Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari.
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ble distribution de facto if not de jure.81
Although the Tronconi decision puts an end to the confusion over adop-
tion of the doctrine, at least in the Fourth District,82 the question re-
mains whether equitable distribution is "a vehicle . . . to effect equity
and justice between the parties or . . . [the] goal to be achieved by
awards of lump sum alimony .... 88 Tronconi quotes Canakaris that
"a judge may award lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribu-
tion,"18 4 but added that an equitable distribution may "take the place of
lump sum alimony or any special equity."8 5 These two statements ap-
pear to be directly in conflict and are difficult to resolve.
Although Tronconi and Canakaris agreed that an equitable distri-
bution must be justified, they disagreed on what criteria should be used
to establish the justification. As its criteria, the Canakaris court quoted
the last paragraph of the alimony statute that says "[t]he court may
consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between
the parties."' The Canakaris court indicated the trial judge has broad
scope in granting lump sum consistent with this statutory mandate.87
On the other hand, when Canakaris discussed the criteria for establish-
ing the need requirement for permanent periodic alimony, reference
was made to the elements in subsection (2)(a) through (f) of the ali-
mony statute.88 It may be assumed from this distinction that the su-
81. Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
82. Contra Hu v. Hu, 432 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (acknowl-
edged the Tronconi decision but respectfully disagreed and held equitable distribution
is not an independent vehicle for property distribution).
83. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d at 552-(Glickstein, J., concurring). Judge Glickstein,
with whom Judge Hurley joined, suggested this precise question be certified to the
Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance: "Was the term Equitable
Distribution as initially used in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980),
intended as a vehicle or device to effect equity and justice between the parties or as the
concomitant goal to be achieved by awards of lump sum alimony, reciprocal and other-
wise?" Id.
84. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201.
85. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d at 549.
86. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1983).
87. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201.
88. Id. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(a) through (f) reads:
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony or maintenance, the court
shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and physical and emotional condition of both parties.
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preme court did not find these elements to be appropriate guidelines for
determining the justification requirement for an equitable distribution.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Canakaris court used subsection
(2)(a) through (f) only as criteria for an award of permanent alimony,
the Tronconi court said, "[w]e see no reason why the provisions of sub-
section (2)(a) through (f) . . . should not also be applicable to an equi-
table distribution ... "89
The Tronconi opinion is clear on one important issue. It is not
mandatory that an equitable distribution be carried out in every case.90
To this end, it is necessary for the party seeking an equitable distribu-
tion to plead it."1 The court gives no guidelines as to how property
should be distributed when an equitable distribution is not made.92
IV. Considerations for Statutory Clarification
A. Statutory Treatment of Equitable Distribution in Other
Jurisdictions
Based on the foregoing discussion of the state of the law in Flor-
ida, it is proposed that the supreme court in the Canakaris decision did
intend to adopt the doctrine of equitable distribution. This would be a
logical conclusion concerning the fact that, according to its proponents,
"'equitable distribution' is a term of art."'93 When "'equitable' and
'distribution' [are] placed in juxtaposition" they have a distinct mean-
(d) The financial resources of each party."
(e) Where applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire suffi-
cient education or training to enable him or her to find appropriate
employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not lim-
ited to services rendered in homemaking, child care, education and career
building of the other party.
The court may consider any other factor necessary to do equity and justice
between the parties.
89. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d at 550.
90. Id. at 549.
91. Id.
92. If an equitable distribution does not have to be carried out automatically in
every case, does, then, the court have the authority to make an inequitable
distribution?
93. Brief on Behalf of the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus
Curiae at I, Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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ing, as do "'special' and 'equity', 'community' and 'property', or 'con-
tributory' and 'negligence'." 94 "To suggest that the Supreme Court of
this state utilized a term employed by the courts and legislatures of
. . . its sister states without realizing or recognizing that the term em-
bodies a doctrine would be tantamount to suggesting that the Court
suffers from myopia approaching total blindness."95
In order to make equitable distribution consistent throughout Flor-
ida, the state legislature should enact an equitable distribution statute.
Presently, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have pro-
vided by statute for equitable distribution of property upon dissolu-
tion.9 6 Several of these states have enacted statutes which grant broad
discretionary power to the courts.9 7 The underlying principle for the
discretionary type statute is that a statutorily prescribed set of criteria
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id. at 2.
96. The states providing for equitable distribution by statute are: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.210 (Supp. 1982); ARK STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-113 (1974 and Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-b-81 (West
Supp. 1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910
(1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (West Supp. 1982-83);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.190 (Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1981); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-04,-05
(1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 33 (West Supp. 1983-84); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.23(1) (West Supp. 1983-84); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West
Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon Supp. 1983); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 40-4-202 (1981), amended by Act of October 1, 1983, ch. 613, 1983 LEG. REV.
121; NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1968)
(titled alimony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp. 1981);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp.
1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon
Supp. 1983-84); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-4-44 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
5 (Supp. 1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 751 (Supp. 1983); WISC. STAT. ANN. §
767.255 (West 1981); WYO. STAT. § 20-2-114 (Supp. 1983).
97. See, e.g, ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.210 (Supp. 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 208, § 33 (West Supp. 1983-84); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552.23(1) (West
Supp. 1983-84); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 1983-84); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(c)(d)(e) (1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-825 (1977); Wyo.
STAT. § 20-2-114 (Supp. 1983).
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may prevent the courts from making a well-founded equitable distribu-
tion. The belief is the trial judge needs to be able to fashion each distri-
bution individually as the facts of the particular case dictates. 8 How-
ever, this wide discretion causes judicial inconsistency in the states
adopting these statutes. 9
Other states have enacted statutes that more specifically set forth
guidelines for an equitable distribution. 100 The Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act'01 served as a model for many of them. Statutes of this
type assist the trial judges in narrowing the issues involved in distribut-
98. See Note, Is There a Need for Equitable Distribution of Property Upon
Divorce in North Carolina?: Leatherman v. Leatherman, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 156, 161-
62 (1979-81).
99. Id. at 162.
100. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-113 (1974 and Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81 (West Supp.
1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1513 (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1981);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (West Supp. 1982-83); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(b)(1) (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236(B)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp.
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1983-84); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 751 (Supp. 1983); WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981).
101. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1973). This
section of the Act addresses disposition of property. The 1973 amendment to the Act
divided this section into two alternatives: alternative A for common-law jusrisdictions
and alternative B for community property jurisdictions. Alternative A provides:
(a) In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal separation, or dis-
position of property following a decree or dissolution of marriage or legal
separation by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent
spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, without
regard to marital misconduct, shall, and in a proceeding for legal separa-
tion may, finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and
assets belonging to either or both however and whenever acquired, and
whether the title thereto is in the name of the husband or wife or both. In
making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the mar-
riage, and prior marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the
parties, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income,
vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the
parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in
addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition
of capital assets and income. The court shall also consider the contribution
or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation,
or appreciation in value of the respective estates and the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker or to the family union.
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ing property.10 2 At the same time, the judge retains discretion to fash-
ion the awards according to the facts.10 3
B. The Separation of Equitable Distribution and Lump Sum
Alimony
Florida can benefit from the experience of her sister states which
have chosen to adopt equitable distribution by statute. Florida's statute
should establish guidelines for making an equitable distribution, yet al-
low judicial discretion to provide for the unique circumstances of each
dissolution.0 In the current state of Florida law the trial judge has
various vehicles which he may use to achieve equity between the par-
ties. These vehicles are lump sum alimony, permanent periodic ali-
mony, rehabilitative alimony, child support, a vested special equity in
property and an award of exclusive possession of property. 0 5 The court
should consider these remedies interrelated when making an equitable
distribution.0 6 "[T]o the extent of their eventual use, the remedies are
102. Note, supra note 98, at 162.
103. Id.
104. The Family Law Section of The Florida Bar suggests the following statute:
(2) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court shall order
such division of marital property as is equitable. The court shall set aside
to each spouse his separate property and shall divide the marital property
in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant
factors including:
(a) The contribution to the marriage by each spouse, including contri-
butions to the care and education of the children and services as
homemaker.
(b) The economic circumstances of the parties.
(c) The duration of the marriage.
(d) Any interruption of personal careers or educational opportunities.
(e) The contribution to the personal career or educational opportunity
of the other spouse.
(f) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition, enhancement,
or improvement of the marital property and the separate property of the
other party.
(g) The existing liabilities of the parties in the acquisition and mainte-
nance of marital property.
(h)The results of any alimony awarded.
Frumkes, Florida's Firm Foundation in Formulating the Doctrine of Eq-
uitable Distribution, 57 FLA. B.J. 327 n.7 (1983).
105. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1202.
106. Id.
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part of one overall scheme." 1 7 Statutorily adopting equitable distribu-
tion would generally leave these vehicles available to the courts. The
proposed equitable distribution statute would clarify the proper use of
these vehicles, and add the factors and guidelines to follow in effecting
an equitable distribution.
Because of the current confusion in Florida courts regarding the
use of lump sum alimony, the equitable distribution statute should ex-
plicate its appropriate use. Basically the statute would require a literal
reading of Florida's alimony statute. Therefore, courts would categorize
an award of alimony as permanent or rehabilitative. In either event, the
alimony award should be based on need and ability to pay, not justifi-
cation and ability to pay. Further qualification of this award would be
with regard to the method of payment. The judge would designate the
payments as either periodic or lump sum. In fact, characterizing an
award of alimony as "lump sum alimony" would be erroneous. Techni-
cally there would be no such vehicle as lump sum alimony. Instead
there would be lump sum payments of permanent or rehabilitative
alimony.
Reading Florida's alimony statute in conjunction with the pro-
posed equitable distribution statute would obligate the courts to recede
from the present position that lump sum alimony may be used indepen-
dently to effect an equitable distribution. Under the equitable distribu-
tion statute there would be no need for courts to employ lump sum
alimony to effect an equitable distribution. An equitable distribution
will be made in every case as a matter of procedure. The following
discussion explicates the paramount factors and guidelines for inclusion
in the proposed Florida equitable distribution statute. Because Florida's
courts and practitioners are in immediate need of clarification in this
area, the Florida legislature should formerly enact an equitable distri-
bution statute without delay. In the interim, it is hoped that the factors
and guidelines as hereinafter set forth will be of help to courts and
attorneys involved in dissolution of marriage cases. 10 8
107. Id.
108. These factors are presented for the purpose of practicality. It is not asserted
that this discussion is exhaustive. Each factor and guideline could be the topic of an
entire note.
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C. Factors to be Included in Florida's Equitable Distribution
Statute
1. Assets to Which Equitable Distribution Will Apply
This factor provides the foundation for each subsequent factor in
the equitable distribution process. Not all the assets owned by the par-
ties, whether individually or jointly, will be subject to an equitable dis-
tribution. Thus, the first step the trial judge must take is to determine
what property is subject to division. This has proven to be one of the
most burdensome tasks for trial judges in effecting an equitable
distribution.
As originally promulgated, Section 307 of the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act1"9 provided that "the court shall assign each spouse's
property to him. It also shall divide the marital property. . . ."o Ac-
cordingly Section 307 provided:
(b) For purposes of this Act, marital property means all property
acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired
before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by
gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a decree or legal
separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
(5) The increase in value of property acquired before the mar-
riage.
(c) All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and
before a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital prop-
erty, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the
spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, ten-
ancy in comon, tenancy by the entirety, and community property.
The presumption of marital property is overcome by showing that
the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (b).111
109. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1970)
(amended 1973).
110. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, § 307.
111. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, § 307(b) and (c) (1970). See, e.g.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1974 and
Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
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According to these provisions property must be designated as ei-
ther marital or separate. The court determines what property is sepa-
rate, which makes it immune from distribution, and proceeds to divide
everything else equitably according to the set guidelines. States follow-
ing this method of designating property are called deferred community
property law systems.112
In the majority of the common-law equitable distribution states,
the designation of property as marital or separate does not completely
limit the court's ability to subject it to an equitable distribution. 113
However, property under the separate category is usually distributed to
the other spouse only in very rare circumstances,' where that spouse
has shown that hardship or inequities will otherwise result." 5 In com-
parison, trial judges in states following the deferred community prop-
erty law system are faced with a smaller pool of assets to distribute
than judges in the common-law equitable distribution states."' Conse-
quently, judges in the common-law equitable distribution states are al-
lowed greater judicial discretion in effectuating property distribution.",
In the current state of the law, Florida recognizes the concept of
separate and marital property through the special equities doctrine.
Florida cases, for example, have found a special equity where property
was acquired with inherited funds of one spouse," 8 and where one
spouse entered the marriage with possession of realty and personalty."9
Further, Florida's case law appears more consistent with the common-
law equitable distribution theory states than the deferred community
property law states. Florida cases evidence the intent that the classifica-
tion of separate property is not made for the purpose of making prop-
erty immune to distribution. Florida, by use of special equities and
112. Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978).
113. See, Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Pre-
liminary Analysis, 6 N.C.L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1983).
114. Id. at 249.
115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981) (separate property not
available for distribution unless refusal to divide would be inequitable). Wisc. STAT.
ANN. § 767.255 (West 1981) (gifts or property exchanged cannot be subject to division
unless hardship would otherwise result).
116. Sharp, supra note 113, at 249.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976); Evans v. Evans, 398 So. 2d
943 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
119. See, e.g., Merrill v. Merrill, 357 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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lump sum alimony, has allowed separate property which should be
awarded to one spouse to be awarded to the other due to exceptional
circumstances.
A case in point is Schwartz v. Schwartz.120 In Schwartz an award
was made to the wife of a thirty percent interest in a vacation home
even though it "was supplied by the husband from sources unconnected
with the marital relationship.' 121 The award was justified by the court
because the wife had contributed substantial labor to making the vaca-
tion home suitable for family life. On the other hand, in Rosen v. Ro-
sen,'22 the trial court made an award of $125,000 in cash to the wife as
lump sum alimony. Upon review, the court of appeal found no "rele-
vant circumstances" to substantiate this award since the husband's as-
sets "were indisputably willed or given to him"'12 and the wife had not
made significant contributions to overcome the presumption that his as-
sets were separate property. Therefore, where a party can show justifi-
cation or exceptional circumstances, assets received by gift, inheritance,
or a source unrelated to the labors of the marital party "should be a
part of the pie, subject to the judicial slice.' 12 ' This is similar to the
more liberal view given separate property in the common-law equitable
distribution states.
Thus, Florida can remain most consistent with judicial intentions
evidenced by prior case law if it adopts a statute patterned after other
common-law equitable distribution states. Subsections (b) and (c) from
the original Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act appear appropriate for
this purpose as long as one addition is made. In order to provide for the
situations where designating property as separate would result in hard-
ship, the following language should be added after the last sentence in
subsection (c): unless the party against which such presumption is as-
serted shows by a preponderance of the evidence that by designating
the property as separate, hardship or inequities will result.125
Because the concept of separate property is basically consistent
120. 396 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
121. Id. at 807.
122. 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
123. Id. at 1272.
124. Frumkes, supra note 61, at 354.
125. Thus the last sentence of the subsection would read: "The presumption of
marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method
listed in subsection (b)", unless the party against whom such presumption is asserted
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that by designating the property as separate
hardship or inequities will result.
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with the theory of special equity, it is superfluous under this type of
statute to retain the use of the special equity doctrine. However, the
two ideas could be used interchangeably if the legislature perceives the
abrogation of the special equity doctrine as inappropriate.
2. Valuation of the Assets
After the court designates the property as separate or marital, the
separate property should be awarded to the appropriate spouse. All the
other property will be subject to division between the parties.126 Before
distribution of the property can commence, the court must be presented
with the net value of the marital assets.227 The attorney is expected to
value the assets acquired during the marriage. These assets include, but
are not limited to, residential and commercial real estate, family and
non-family businesses, stocks, bonds, personal property, pensions, re-
tirement plans, professional degrees, bank accounts, and insurance
policies.128
Property valuation is a highly sophisticated process. "It is neces-
sary [for the attorney] to trace forward the assets which the parties
owned before the marriage, and trace backward those assets which
presently exist. 1 29 Counsel must "obtain full and complete discovery of
all assets and uncover hidden sources."130 The parties may stipulate to
the value of all or part of the marital property.131 When there is a
dispute regarding value the'assistance of experts becomes an integral
part of the valuation process. The number and type of experts that are
126. Of course, either spouse may invoke the proposed addition to subsection (c)
of the statute which allows that party to show that a designation as separate property
would result in hardship or inequities. This could be done at any point during the pro-
ceedings. Therefore, even if the judge excludes a certain property from distribution, the
party may make a showing to later include it, if without it the distribution will not be
equitable.
127. Note, The North Carolina Act For Equitable Distribution of Marital
Property, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 735, 750 (1982).
128. Id. See generally Donahue, Trying Equitable Distribution Can Be Trying,
5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 225 (1981-82); Mulligan, Inside an Equitable Distribution
Trial, 8 LITGATION 24 (1982); Grosman, Identification and Valuation of Assets Sub-
ject to Equitable Distribution, 56 N.D.L. REv. 201 (1980).
129. Donahue, supra at 228.
130. Knight and Elser, Critical Factors Which Influence Equitable Distribution
Awards, 55 FLA. B.J. 581 (1981).
131. Note, supra note 127, at 750.
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involved depend on the assets involved in the particular case. 132 An ac-
countant is frequently used and is most valuable for purposes of tax
analysis.1 " They are also used as appraisers for purposes of business
valuation.134 Nonetheless, since business valuations vary according to
the nature of the business,1 35 specialized appraisers or financial analysts
are most suitable."" A real estate appraiser should be used to value
real property.13 7 "Additional methods of valuation include truly compa-
rable market sales, reconstruction costs and 'face value of effective in-
surance.' The tax value of the property has been held not to be reflec-
tive of market value."'38
3. Distribution of Assets: Guidelines for Equitable Distribution
Once the property has been classified and the marital assets val-
ued, the court will proceed to distribute the marital property. It is com-
pulsory that the division of property is equitable, based on the particu-
lar facts of the case. The Florida courts have distinguished equitable
from equal. 39 "The two words are not synonymous."' 40 Yet, as the
court in Mahaffey v. Mahaffey14 ' recognized "an equal division of the
assets . . . is a good starting point in most cases."142
The suggestion that there be a presumption of an equal division is
not a suggestion that Florida become a community property state. Un-
like the community property states, there is "no mandate for making
an equal division of the marital acquisitions in all cases."'143 The judge
still has the discretion to do equity according to the circumstances of
the particular case. 44 Beginning with the presumption that the marital
132. Donahue, supra note 128, at 227.
133. Id. at 227. For cases involving intricate tax problems, the tax attorney may
be the most appropriate expert. Id. at 228.
134. Id. at 227. However, the author cautions against use of accountants to value
business. "Accountants should only be used to value business or professional practices
in those instances where no other expert is available." Id.
135. Note, supra note 127, at 751.
136. Donahue, supra note 128, at 228.
137. Note, supra note 127, at 751.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1204 (Fla. 1980).
140. Tronconi v. Tronconi, 425 So. 2d 547, 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
141. 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
142. Id. at 1374.
143. Bullard v. Bullard, 385 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
144. Id. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1983). This statute re-
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property will be divided equally, the judge will consider each element
in the proposed guidelines that follow. If the facts of the case require
consideration of a given guideline, the judge will adjust the division
accordingly. The equal starting point gives the judge a relative basis by
which to weigh each guideline. 145
The following proposed guidelines are not listed in order of impor-
tance. Some factors may weigh more than others depending on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. This list of guidelines was compiled
by reviewing Florida's alimony statute and case law, as well as the stat-
utes from the other states that have adopted equitable distribution.1 46
(1) "The duration of the marriage.1 47 In a long marriage the
court should give weight to one spouse's dependence, economically or
emotionally, on the other spouse.1 48 Also, with a long marriage the
courts will have a stronger presumption that the marital assets were
accumulated through the cooperative efforts of both parties. 49 If it is a
short marriage the court will be less likely to find either party depen-
dent on the other.150
(2) "The age of the parties."15
(3) "The physical and emotional health of the parties. '1 52
quires the court to make an equal division unless an equal division would be inequita-
ble. When the court deems an equal division inequitable, the court is given guidelines
to determine how the property will be distributed.
145. See Note, supra note 127, at 752-53.
146. A more specific focus was given to the statutes of North Carolina, New
York, Maine, Illinois, Iowa and the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307.
Citations to states for certain guidelines are not exhaustive, but they are felt to be
representative of the general inclusion in equitable distribution statutes.
147. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(b) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236(5)(d)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(3)
(Supp. 1981); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
148. See Note, supra note 127, at 755.
149. Knight and Elser, supra note 130, at 583.
150. See Note, supra note 127, at 755-56.
151. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 236(5)(d)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(3)
(Supp. 1981); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(d) (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84).
152. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(c) (West Supp. 1983); IowA CODE
ANN. § 598.21(1)(d) (West 1981 and West Supp. 1983-84). These statutes refer to the
physical and emotional health of the parties, while others refer to the physical and
mental health of the parties. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(3) (Supp. 1981).
The court should ultimately consider all areas of health; physical, emotional and
mental.
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(4) "Any obligation arising out of a prior marriage."153 When a
spouse is paying alimony or child support to a previous spouse, "the
court should compensate the non-paying spouse for any reduction of
marital assets due to this obligation. ' ' x 4
(5) "Any antenuptial agreement or property settlement entered
into by the parties.'1 55
(6) "The need of a parent with" primary parental responsibility
of minor children born or adopted "of the marriage to occupy or own
the marital residence and to use or own its household effects. 1156
This quideline naturally overlaps the vehicle of exclusive possession of
property. The judge should make an award of exclusive possession ac-
cording to the established equities of the situation. Of course, the judge
may order the non-custodial spouse to transfer his title to the home and
contents rather than using the more temporary vehicle of exclusive
possession.
(7) The amount and sources of "income, property and liabilities
of each party at the time the division of property is to become effec-
tive."1 57 The court should consider any loans or mortgages outstanding
on marital property.
(8) "The standard of living established during the marriage. "158
(9) "The vested pension or retirement rights and the expectations
of non-vested pension or retirement rights. '159 As compared to other
guidelines in the equitable distribution list, this one has received a
great deal of judicial attention. The consensus appears to be that pen-
sion and retirement rights are "an economic resource acquired with the
fruits of the wage earner spouse's labors which would otherwise have
been utilized by the parties during the marriage to purchase other de-
153. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(2) (Supp. 1981); UNIFORM MAR-
RIAGE AND DIvORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
154. Note, supra note 127, at 755.
155. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307
(1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(l)(k)(1) (West 1981 and West Supp. 1983-34).
156. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(4) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(g)
(West 1981 and West Supp. 1983-84).
157. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1) (Supp. 1981).
158. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2)(a) (West Supp. 1983); UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
159. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(5) (Supp. 1981) (although consid-
ered this factor is designated as separate property under this statute); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83) (this statute also includes the loss
of inheritance).
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ferred income assets."160 Unless some exceptional circumstances are
shown, these assets should be included as marital property.
(10) "Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to
help educate or develop the career potential of the other spouse."' 6'1
Generally, courts do not designate a professional degree as marital,
property. 162 This is largely due to the fact that a professional degree is
not a tangible asset which may be easily divided. Nonetheless, accord-
ing to the partnership theory of marriage, when the marital partners
work together toward a common goal they may both anticipate in-
creased family income as the return on their efforts."'3 The court
should consider the efforts of each party in relation to the probable
future financial circumstances of each party.
(11) "The difficulty of evaluating any component asset of any in-
terest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desir-
ability of retaining such asset or interest, intact and free from any
claim or interference by the other party.9' 'L
(12) "The liquid or non-liquid character of all marital
property.'$1 65
(13) Any award of alimony to either spouse.66 The court should
be guided by Florida's alimony statute when making an award of per-
manent or rehabilitative alimony. The needs of each of the parties
should be provided for under this guideline. Included in this considera-
tion are the occupation, vocational skills and employability of both
spouses.167 The time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient edu-
cation or training to enable him or her to find employment should espe-
160. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 121, 437 A.2d 883, 888 (1981).
161. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.08(2)(f) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1982-83).
162. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re
Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
163. See generally Note, The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Other's Profes-
sional Degree Upon Divorce, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 130 (1983).
164. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(9) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
83); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(10) (Supp. 1981).
165. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(7) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
83).
166. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-
83); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. § 307 (1979).
167. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 307
(1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(f) (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84).
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cially be considered as it relates to rehabilitative alimony.
(14) "Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect con-
tribution made to the acquisition of marital property. . . including
joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack
thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker."1 8 The
direct financial contributions of the parties are easiest to value and di-
vide. The courts may experience much more difficulty when valuing
and dividing the indirect contributions of the parties, especially as it
relates to the services of a spouse as homemaker or parent. The courts
use three methods to value the services of a homemaker. The most
often used is the specific-task approach. It values each job performed
by the homemaker according to the separate marketable value of that
individual skill.169 Basically "the hours per week devoted to each func-
tion is . . . multiplied by the hourly wage a person employed in that
occupation would earn. .... ,1"7o The replacement-cost approach is very
similar to the specific-task method. The difference is that replacement
cost is aggregated. "[T]he total hours an individual is likely to spend in
home production is determined and then valued at the market wage for
domestic help."1 1 The third method is the opportunity-cost approach.
It is based on computation of the wage rate multiplied by the number
of hours of non-market production, resulting in the worth of the home-
maker non-market services.1 72 "This approach leads [to the conclusion]
that the value of the time spent in menial chores, such as doing laun-
dry, of an individual with high earnings is worth relatively more than
the time devoted to these services by individuals who command less in
the marketplace. 17 3 Whichever approach is used by the courts, there
must be consideration given to the contribution made by the home-
168. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(6) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21(1)(e)
(West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84). See generally Kulzer, Law and the Housewife: Prop-
erty, Divorce, and Death, 28 U. FLA. L.R. 1 (1975). According to the Commissioner's
comment to the 1973 amendment of the UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DiVORCE AcT, 9A
U.L.A. § 307 (1979), allowance for the contribution of homemaker services is a new
concept in Anglo American law.
169. See Kiker, Evaluating Household Services, 16 TRIAL, February 1980, at
34.
170. Brandes, Proving the Value of a Homemaker (pt. 1), 2 FAIRSHARE, Novem-
ber 1982, at 5, 6.
171. Kiker, supra note 169, at 34. It should be noted, that the specific-task ap-
proach and the replacement-cost approach are used interchangeably by some authors.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 34.
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maker. The idea that the homemaker's contributions are immune to
monetary valuation is pass6.
(15) "The fringe benefits received by the homemaker/spouse."' I 4
The court should consider the benefits the homemaker spouse receives
as a result of the marriage. Such considerations include room and
board, health care, transportation, etc.175
(16) "The tax consequences [of the property distribution or
awards] made to each party.'.7
(17) The cost of attorney's fees. An award of attorney's fees may
be made to avoid an inequitable diminution of the other awards made
by the court.'7
(18) Any contribution by either spouse to the dissipation or de-
preciation of the marital assets.'7 8 Any financial misconduct must be
considered by the court to reduce the distribution to the spouse at fault.
"Financial misconduct involves wasting or dissipating of marital
assets.1 7 9
(19) The value of property set apart to each spouse as separate
property. This guideline overlaps the vehicle of special equity. Usually
separate property (or property awarded to a spouse as a special equity)
is not subject to distribution under the guidelines. However, it may be
considered when the party against which a special equity property
award has been made, shows that hardship or inequities will result
from the award. In this situation the court may consider the value of
the separate property relative to distribution of the remaining marital
174. Knight and Elser, supra note 130, at 584.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1 1) (Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(1)0) (West 1981 and Supp. 1983-84). See generally Weissman, Is Equitable
Distribution Incident to Florida Divorce a Taxable Event Under Davis?, FLA. B.J.,
Jan. 1983, at 42. See also U.S. v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1964) (interpreting state law,
the court ruled that a husband realized a taxable gain on the transfer of appreciated
property to his wife pursuant to a negotiated property settlement). As a caveat, it
should be noted that there is currently pending before the legislature a tax reform bill
which, if passed, will cause significant changes in the tax ramifications of property
distributions.
177. See generally Note, supra note 127, at 760. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382
So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1980), indicated the court should follow legislative intent and ensure
that both parties have similar ability to be represented. Further, Canakaris held that
attorney's fees may be awarded to avoid diminution of the wife's fiscal awards.
178. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT, 9A U.L.A. § 306
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
179. Note, supra note 127, at 760.
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property.
(20) The effect of marital misconduct on the accumulation or de-
pletion of marital assets. A frequently asked question since the
Canakaris decision is whether its use of the word "justification" rela-
tive to equitable distributions reintroduces fault into dissolution
proceedings. 180
Since the introduction of equitable distribution most cases have
only referred to fault when it is relative to the financial condition of the
parties. In Mendel v. MendeP18 1 the trial court excluded evidence of the
husband's marital misconduct. The district court reversed, stating that
adultery must be considered as it "relates to the husband's expendi-
tures of funds and the relationship of those expenditures to the eco-
nomic situation in which the parties stand before the court. 1 8 2 In
Hurtado v. Hurtado83 the district court considered the husband's mar-
180. When Florida became a no-fault state, it excluded the criterion that fault
be shown before a dissolution would be granted. Yet, fault was not excluded in the
context of monetary awards. Abrahams, The Effect of Marital Misconduct on Mone-
tary Awards, 57 FLA. B.J., Feb. 1983, at 95. Under Florida's alimony statute adultery
may still be considered in determining the amount of alimony, if any, that should be
awarded to the spouse asking for alimony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp.
1979). Although the statute refers to adultery only in relation to the spouse seeking
alimony, the courts have not retained this limited view. See, e.g., McClelland v. Mc-
Clelland, 318 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (persistent adultery of hus-
band relevant even though he did not petition for alimony); Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) (husband's marital misconduct was considered since he attempted to
use wife's misconduct as defense to alimony). Generally, adultery has been considered
whenever the court feels it is necessary to do justice between the parties. The latest
Florida Supreme Court decision to consider this issue was Williamson v. Williamson,
367 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1979). The Williamson court denied a general consideration of
marital misconduct in dissolution cases. The court said:
Whether such an inquiry [into marital misconduct] is proper will depend
upon the circumstances of each case. Today we hold only that where an
analysis of the need of one spouse and the ability of the other to pay dem-
onstrates that both parties will suffer economic hardship as a result of any
division of available resources the court might make, the court may then
consider, as an equitable circumstance under section 61.08(2), Florida
Statutes (1975), any conduct of either party which may have caused the
difficult economic situation in which they stand before the court.
Williamson, 367 So. 2d at 1019. This decision gave the trial judge broad discretion
when considering adultery.
181. 386 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
182. Id. at 628.
183. 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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ital misconduct to the extent that he was paying rent on the apartment
he shared with his mistress.
Under this equitable distribution statute marital misconduct
should be considered only as it affects the spouse's financial contribu-
tion to the marital partnership. If the fault affects the accumulation or
depletion of the marital assets, an appropriate adjustment should be
made in the relativ, if any, that should be awarded to the spouse asking
for alimony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1979). n620] to
the distribution of the marital assets.
(21) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between
the parties.85 The guidelines are not meant to be "inflexible rules of
law which unduly restrict the trial judge in determining what is equita-
ble and just." 8 ' This catch-all guideline allows the judge to fashion
each judgment as the particular facts dictate, keeping in mind the pre-
viously prescribed guidelines and the ultimate goal of making an equi-
table distribution.
Finally, the court should state its basis and reasons for dividing the
property as it has deemed equitable.187
V. Conclusion
For several years, Florida has recognized the partnership concept
of marriage. Under this concept, the contributions of both parties in
accumulating the marital assets are considered. Equitable distribution
is a logical extension of the partnership view, as it requires a fair divi-
sion of the marital assets according to the relative contributions of both
partners.
Florida has taken definite, yet enigmatic, advancements in Brown,
Canakaris, and Tronconi, towards judicially adopting the doctrine of
equitable distribution. However, the courts have fallen far short of
transforming Florida from a common-law title state to an equitable dis-
tribution state.
Working within the constraints of the existent legislative enact-
ments relative to property distribution and alimony, the courts have
184. Brief on Behalf of the Family Law Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 93, at 6.
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West Supp. 1983); N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1982-83).
186. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 951 (Fla. 1980).
187. Cf., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214(a)(1) (Supp. 1983).
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most frequently used the vehicle of lump sum alimony to effect an equi-
table distribution. At the same time, the courts continue to use lump
sum as a payment method of permanent alimony. When making an
award of permanent alimony in lump sum payments, the courts require
a showing of need and ability to pay. When making an equitable distri-
bution by using the vehicle of lump sum alimony, the courts require
justification rather than need. To exasperate the confusion over lump
sum alimony, the same criteria are being utilized to determine need
and justification, which are two inherently opposed principles. In addi-
tion, the interrelation of the special equities doctrine in the process of
equitable distribution is difficult to ascertain.
Accordingly, Florida is in immediate need of clarification on two
issues. First, courts and counsel need a pronouncement as to whether
Florida is truly an equitable distribution state. In December, 1983, the
Florida Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on the Tronconi ap-
peal.188 The supreme court should accept the invitation this case offers
to definitively adopt the doctrine of equitable distribution. Second,
courts and counsel require clarification on the appropriate factors and
guidelines to follow in effectuating an equitable distribution. The Flor-
ida legislature must prescribe these by statute, as have sixty-six percent
of its sister states. Generally, the statute should provide that a trial
judge do the following in a dissolution proceeding:
(1) The judge must provide for the needs of any minor children.
The vehicles available and appropriate for this priority are child sup-
port and/or an award of exclusive possession of property to the parent
with whom the children live.
(2) The judge may provide for the support of a needy spouse. The
appropriate vehicles available are alimony and/or exclusive possession
of property. An award of alimony should be made only if it is set out in
the pleadings and only upon the required showings of need and ability.
An alimony award should be made according to the types and pay-
ments set out in Florida's alimony statute. Thus the judge may award
rehabilitative alimony in periodic or lump sum payments, or both; or
the judge may award permanent alimony in periodic or lump sum pay-
ments, or both.
(3) The judge must distribute, as separate property, the property
and material wealth in which one spouse possesses a vested interest.
188. The Florida Supreme Court has scheduled oral arguments for December 6,
1983. Attorney for appellant is Ira Marcus, P.A., Fort Lauderdale. Attorney for Ap-
pellee is Philip Michael Cullen, III, Fort Lauderdale.
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The appropriate vehicle for this is a special equity. A finding of a spe-
cial equity requires that the property was acquired or brought into the
marriage by a source independent of the efforts of the marital partner-
ship, or that it was acquired by contributions of one marital partner
which are considered to be clearly over and above the normal marital
duties. Thus a special equity will not be found when the contributions
are considered to be required in the normal course of a marital
relationship.
(4) After the awards of child support, alimony, exclusive posses-
sion of property and special equities are made, the court must divide
and distribute the property and wealth acquired in the course of the
marriage. To do this, the court will use the factors and guidelines es-
tablished for effectuating an equitable distribution.
Melinda S. Gentile
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